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This study evaluated two computerized interventions intended to reduce the frequency of 
negatively-valenced repetitive thought and negative emotions that accompany these 
thoughts in college students prescreened for elevated levels of anxiety. The current study 
also tested the moderating effects of participants’ tendency toward different types of 
repetitive thought, specifically rumination and worry, on outcomes including the amount 
of time spent discussing the thought, positive affectivity and negative affectivity. The 
rumination intervention was created for this study and based on goal progress theory, 
whereas the worry intervention was adapted from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. 
Findings revealed no moderating effect of the tendency to engage in a specific type of 
repetitive thought. Instead, participants who received the worry intervention spent less 
time focusing on their thought and used less negative emotion words during a post-
intervention verbalization period than those who received the rumination intervention 
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Everyone thinks about negative aspects of their lives from time to time, but for 
some people negative thoughts can become uncontrollable and repetitive. Those who 
experience unusually high levels of repeated negative thoughts have an increased risk for 
debilitating forms of psychopathology that can adversely affect their close relationships, 
work, and ability to enjoy their day-to-day lives. Repetitive thought is defined as thinking 
attentively, repetitively or frequently about oneself and one's world (Segerstrom, 2003).  
In this study, repetitive thought is considered a global construct that encompasses 
different types of thought.  Though there are a number of types of repetitive though, this 
study focuses on rumination and worry1. Rumination is defined as the process of 
repetitively and passively thinking about negative emotions, consequences, meanings and 
symptoms of distress (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Worry is defined as uncontrollable 
thoughts and images that are negatively affect laden and represents an attempt to solve a 
future problem that has the possibility of one or more negative outcomes (Borkovec, 
Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). 
Repetitive thought is consistently associated with anxious and/or depressive 
symptoms (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sabrava, 2007; Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken & 
Mayer 2005; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Molina, Borkovec, Peasley, & Person, 1998). 
Rumination is often researched in connection with depression and worry is one of the 
                                                 
1 Worry and rumination are not the only types of repetitive thought that can be problematic. 
Another often-studied type of thought is obsessional thought, a central feature of Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD). However, obsessions have been shown to differ from worry (Langlois, Freeston, 
Ladouceur, 2008) and in reliable ways such as being egodystonic and less likely to actually happen.   
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primary characteristics of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p. 472). Figure 1 contains a diagram showing the 
frequent conceptualization of relationships between repetitive thought, worry, 
rumination, Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD). However, the arrows in the diagram indicate the other associations that have 
been found to exist between both types of repetitive thought and both disorders. 
Although the repetitive thought literature is large and diverse, there are not yet 
treatments or treatment components of known efficacy that reliably decrease repetitive 
thought. The dearth of efficacious interventions for repetitive thought is partly due to the 
lack of integration across different subfields of psychology. For instance, laboratory 
studies investigating the basic science of repetitive thought have provided strong 
experimental evidence regarding the causal mechanisms of various types of repetitive 
thought, but have rarely pursued questions of direct interest to clinicians interested in 
interventions.  Conversely, applied research focuses more on the association between 
worry and anxiety disorders and between rumination and depression.  However, applied 
studies rarely incorporate experimental designs to investigate the causal mechanisms 
underlying repetitive thought or the causal effects of specific treatment components 
intended to reduce specific types of repetitive thought.    
Ultimately, the divide between laboratory studies that carry little direct clinical 
relevance and applied studies that provide little specificity regarding the causal effects of 
proposed treatment components for repetitive thought has led to a lack of effective 
treatment for repetitive thought underlying anxiety and mood disorders. The purpose of 
the current study was to translate the strength of experimental laboratory studies into 
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treatment components that reduce repetitive thought.  In the following sections, the 
literature on worry and rumination will be reviewed and then a developmental model for 
how repetitive thought could be an important link in the development of comorbid 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Major Depression Disorder is proposed. This is 





Review of the Literature 
Two Dimensions of Repetitive Thought 
 A major impediment to integrative progress between laboratory studies and 
applied studies of repetitive thought has been a lack of clarity regarding the structure and 
content of the construct of repetitive thought itself. Across a series of three experimental 
studies, Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, and Shortridge (2003) attempted to empirically 
integrate maladaptive and adaptive repetitive thought into a dimensional framework.   
The first study included measures of emotional processing, reactions to stressful 
events, worry, rumination, and personality in 979 undergraduate students. All of the 
repetitive thought and personality measures were then multidimensionally scaled and a 
two-dimensional model of repetitive thought was found (see Figure 2).  As seen in Figure 
2, the first dimension, related to valence, is represented on the y-axis. At the positive end 
were optimism, mood repair and clarity of feelings whereas at the negative end were 
neuroticism, self-reproach, lack of control and distractibility. The second dimension 
related to the purpose of the thought can be seen on the x-axis, with one end reflecting 
searching for new ideas and experiences and the other end reflecting solving problems 
and improving certainty.  The searching end was related to openness to experience, need 
for cognition, reflection, and introspection.  The solving end of the spectrum was related 
to factors such as emotional clarity, worry, rehearsal and processing. In the second study, 
it was found that the valence spectrum was also related to affect, controllability and 
helpfulness. Higher anxiety was predicted by more negative repetitive thought, 
depression and anxiety were related to negative repetitive thought, and more searching 
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thoughts were associated with higher depression. Negative repetitive thought also 
predicted higher self-reported cognitive problems and more negative physical symptoms. 
Research on characteristics of worriers lends support to this model, as it has been found 
that intolerance of uncertainty predicts trait levels of worry, even after anxiety has been 
partialled out (Dugas, Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997). In sum, both worry and rumination 
are negatively valenced repetitive thought, but whereas worry is located on the solving 
end of the purpose spectrum, rumination is located on the searching end of the purpose 
spectrum. 
The relationship between rumination and searching has also been explored in 
studies that   looked at differences between maladaptive and adaptive forms of 
rumination. Two subtypes of rumination have been identified: “reflective pondering,” 
which is focused on how to improve one’s depressive symptoms, and “brooding,” which 
is focused on the negative aspects of one’s situation (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). When these concepts are mapped onto Segerstrom et al.’s model, both 
types of rumination would be located on the searching end of the purpose spectrum, but 
on opposite ends of the valence spectrum, with brooding on the negative side and 
pondering on the positive side. A longitudinal study measuring these two types of 
rumination separately showed that a year after completing measures of rumination, 
participants who rated higher on the reflective pondering scale scored lower on measures 
of depression than those who had scored highly on brooding (Treynor, Gonzalez, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Segerstrom et al.’s framework was used to conceptualize worry 
and rumination in this study.  Because this study is concerned with maladaptive repetitive 
thought, the focus was on negatively valenced ruminative thought and worry.  
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This framework highlights some of the differences between types of repetitive 
thought.  There have also been reliable differences found between people that have a 
general tendency to worry and those that have a general tendency to ruminate.  
How are Ruminators and Worriers Different? 
Everyone worries and ruminates at one time or another. Who hasn't worried about 
the outcome of an upcoming event or alternatively, ruminated about something said or 
done in the past? Even though most people have these experiences, there seem to be clear 
differences in a variety of domains between those that have a general tendency toward 
rumination and those that tend to worry.    
Cognitive and Behavioral Differences. Worriers and ruminators have been found 
to differ in their cognitive appraisals of and behavioral responses toward unwanted 
thoughts. In a recent pair of studies that explored these differences (Watkins, 2004), 
participants chose one worry and one rumination from a list of common worries and a list 
of common ruminations and then answered a number of questions regarding their 
appraisals and strategies for dealing with each of their chosen unwanted thoughts using 
the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & 
Gagnon, 1991). The study also included a measure of the tendency to worry (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) and a measure of the tendency to ruminate 
(RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). People with a higher tendency to ruminate 
were more likely to endorse having a great need to understand a situation and also tended 
to rate the situation they were thinking about as more personally important. Those who 
had a higher tendency to worry reported greater disapproval of their intrusive thoughts 
and were more likely to replace a worrisome intrusion with an unpleasant thought as a 
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way of dealing with the intrusive thought (Watkins, 2004). A different study using the 
same sample compared the differences in the appraisals and strategies used to handle 
worries with those used for rumination. The results showed no significant differences in 
appraisals and strategies between worries and ruminations, but did show that worry 
tended to be future-oriented. The combination of these two studies show that although an 
individual person may react similarly to something classified as a rumination and 
something classified as a worry, they may approach these thoughts in ways that are 
characteristic of their general tendency. In another study that explored response 
tendencies to intrusive thoughts participants described and evaluated hypothetical 
reactions and responsese to seven unwanted thoughts. Using cluster and factor analyses 
the authors found three broad categories of responses, two of which they labeled effortful 
and one non-effortful (Freeston, et al., 1991). The non-effortful responses involved a lack 
of action taken in response to the thought and were related to the participant's self-
reassurance and acceptance of the thought’s presence. The two effortful responses were 
labeled escape/avoidance and attentive thinking. Participants in the escape/avoidance 
category tried to suppress their unwanted thoughts, to escape or avoid them using 
thought-stopping or distracting or by replacing the disturbing thought with another 
thought. The participants in the attentive thinking category gave the thought persistent 
attention, focused on thinking about why the thought existed and were more likely to 
seek reassurance. The participants in both of the effortful conditions were more anxious 
and had more difficulty removing the thought.  
It is possible that the tendency to cognitively avoid unwanted thoughts could lead 
to the behavior of worrying, and the tendency to focus on unwanted thoughts could lead 
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to the behavior of ruminating. If this is the case, even though worry and rumination share 
many similar characteristics and are both representative of negatively valenced repetitive 
thought, people may engage in these processes for different reasons and it may follow 
that different interventions may be more effective for different people.  
Physiological Differences. Both worry and rumination have been tied to 
physiological measures of stress, but in different ways. Worry has been shown to have a 
dampening influence on physiological symptoms, whereas rumination has been found to 
have the opposite effect.  
According to the cognitive-avoidance theory of worry, worriers avoid the distress 
caused by unwanted thoughts by thinking about them in a verbal way rather than using 
imagery, which reduces physiological reactivity. Worry has been associated with a higher 
ratio of thought to imagery when compared to rumination (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & 
Sibrava, 2007), and verbal statements about feared situations or material have been 
shown to elicit very low cardiovascular response whereas visual imagination of that scene 
results in an increase in heart rate (Vrana, Cuthbert & Lang, 1986).  Another study found 
that speech-anxious participants who either engaged in worrying or a relaxation exercise 
before seeing images of their feared situation showed a strong heart rate reaction if they 
had relaxed beforehand, but almost no reaction if they had worried beforehand (Borkovec 
& Hu, 1990). This may be somewhat counterintuitive because worry is a primary 
characteristic of GAD and anxiety is often associated with an overall elevated 
physiological state. However, psychophysiological studies have often failed to find 
evidence of increased autonomic arousal in GAD (Andor, Gerlach, & Rist, 2008). In fact, 
muscle tension is often the only measure of tension that is consistently elevated in those 
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with GAD. It has recently been shown that those with GAD have a heightened awareness 
of physiological reactivity and this may be responsible for the reported elevations in 
physiological symptoms. Worry seems to be a way to prevent emotional processing and 
therefore prevent physiological responses that normally accompany feared situations 
(Andor et al., 2008). In this way it seems to be a maladaptive protective mechanism that 
protects one from emotional distress. Supporting this idea are studies that have found a 
negative relationship between levels of physiological arousal and GAD (Brown, 
Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998). It has also been found that worry is associated with 
suppression of amygdala activation, the part of the brain involved in emotional 
processing (Hoehn-Saric, Lee, McLeod, & Yong, 2005). 
Rumination seems to have a different impact on physiological responses than 
worry. One method used to gauge physiological stress is measuring levels of cortisol, a 
hormone released from the adrenal cortex into the bloodstream in times of psychological 
stress that is related to the “fight or flight” response to threats A recent study that looked 
at the possible physiological impact of rumination took measures of salivary cortisol from 
115 undergraduates who had experienced some kind of interpersonal transgression (such 
as arguments with a romantic partner, romantic infidelity or an insult by a family 
member) within the past week (Mccullough, Brandon, Orsulak, & Akers, 2007). Cortisol 
levels were then measured every two weeks for as many as five more times. On occasions 
that participants reported ruminating more than usual they had higher levels of salivary 
cortisol than they normally did. How fearful the participant was of the transgressor was 
directly related to the cortisol level, and the authors suggested that like fear, rumination 
was an adaptive strategy intended to alert us and keep us from previously experienced 
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threats (McCullough et al., 2007). This finding fits in well with research that has shown 
that one primary difference between the content of worry and rumination is that 
rumination tends to be focused on the past (Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). The 
release of cortisol can be adaptive in dealing with short-term challenging situations, but 
prolonged release of cortisol has been shown to have predict negative health outcomes 
such as the onset of diabetes and high blood pressure (Andrews, Wadiwalla, Juster, Lord 
et al., 2007), so although rumination may have been an adaptive strategy at one point, 
persistent and uncontrollable rumination may have consequences to physical as well as 
mental health.  
Basic Science Laboratory Studies of Repetitive Thought: What Causes and Maintains 
Repetitive Thought? 
Basic science studies of repetitive thought have for the most part focused on 
understanding its causal mechanisms with little intention to generate interventions to 
reduce repetitive thought. These studies have mostly occurred in a laboratory setting and 
are characterized by strong internal validity. Early research on repetitive thought often 
focused on the intentional suppression of unwanted intrusive thoughts, and tended not to 
differentiate between different types of intrusive or repetitive thoughts such as worry or 
rumination. 
 Thought Suppression. A technique once used in cognitive behavioral therapy 
called thought-stopping involved actively suppressing unwanted thoughts (Wolpe & 
Lazarus, 1966). However, research on active thought suppression has shown it tends to 
have paradoxical effects (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987; Abramowitz, Tolin, 
& Street, 2001). Early research on repetitive thought focused on the effects of 
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suppression of intrusive thoughts. In one of the earliest examples of suppression research, 
participants were asked to speak aloud about any thoughts that came into their minds 
after being instructed not to think about a white bear (Wegner et al., 1987). Half of the 
participants were asked to speak aloud about anything that came to mind for five minutes 
while experimenters recorded what they said. After this was a suppression period in 
which participants were instructed specifically not to think of a white bear while speaking 
aloud for five more minutes. After the suppression period was an expression period in 
which participants were again asked to speak aloud for five minutes, but this time they 
were asked to try to think of a white bear. The rest of the participants went through the 
same process except the instructions were reversed so that the suppression period 
followed the expression period. Both groups were unable to suppress thoughts of a white 
bear. The group that initially experienced the suppression period expressed the target 
thoughts (thoughts of the white bear) at a significantly higher frequency during the 
expression period than those who were initially asked to think of a white bear, an 
outcome the authors termed the rebound effect (Wegner et al., 1987).   
  Wegner initially explained the rebound effect with the association hypothesis. The 
association hypothesis holds that the rebound effect is due to negative cuing. During the 
suppression period, when one is attempting to distract from the unwanted thought, the 
items that serve as distracters come to be associated with the unwanted thought. For 
example, if a person is attempting to suppress thoughts of a white bear and looking 
around the room in an effort to distract themselves from the unwanted thought, their 
thought process might look something like this:  don't think of a white bear, think of that 
table. The table then becomes associated with the effort of attempting not to think of a 
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white bear and in that way actually becomes a cue for the initial unwanted thought. 
Although the association hypothesis can account for the rebound effect, it is unable to 
account for another side effect sometimes associated with depression, the enhancement 
effect.  
The enhancement effect occurs when the frequency of unwanted thoughts that 
occur during a suppression period exceed that of a non-suppression period. The Ironic 
Process Theory (Wegner, 1992) holds that during and after suppression periods, the to-
be-avoided thought is more accessible than other thoughts due to the operation of two 
mechanisms of mental control at work during suppression, one conscious and one 
unconscious. During suppression, the conscious operating process searches for distracters 
from the unwanted thought. The unconscious process is a relatively effortless monitoring 
process that searches for the presence of the unwanted thought and alerts the operating 
process that more effort is needed (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). The combination of these 
processes can be effective, but when a person is under duress (e.g. emotional stress) or 
needing to concentrate on something else (e.g. one’s work), the conscious operating 
process becomes distracted from its goal of finding distracter thoughts (Wegner & Erber, 
1992). The monitoring process is unconscious, requires little mental effort, and is less 
likely to be impacted by the need to focus on multiple details. Because of the two 
processes’ differing responses to cognitive and emotional distractions, when one is under 
duress or distracted by the need to concentrate on something else the thoughts are no 
longer provided by the operating process, but instead by the monitoring process, which is 
searching for unwanted thoughts, leading to an enhancement effect. In a study that looked 
at cognitive accessibility of suppressed thoughts participants were asked on two separate 
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occasions to imagine past events (Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993). On one occasion 
they were asked to think of a personal failure, and on another they were asked to think of 
a success. Following this, they completed a computer task. One condition was told not to 
think of the event whereas the other condition was asked to continue thinking of the 
event. The computer task involved a Stroop task in which target words were either 
relevant or irrelevant to their corresponding success or failure. Participants who were 
attempting to suppress their thoughts showed increased color-naming response times for 
target words, whereas participants who were trying not to think about a personal success 
or failure had more difficulty perceiving the colors of words related to that event showing 
higher accessibility to the thought. Conversely, participants instructed to continue to 
think about their success or failure showed less interference with naming the color, 
indicating less accessibility to the thought (Wegner et al., 1993). These results support the 
Ironic Process Theory. 
Results from studies of suppression have been somewhat inconsistent when it 
comes to enhancement effects, whereas rebound effects have been more reliably 
demonstrated. A meta-analysis that included the outcomes of 28 articles that included 60 
comparisons between thought suppression and control groups found the weighted 
rebound effect size to be positive and small to moderate, according to Cohen's guidelines 
(d+=.30; Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001). The results showed no significant initial 
enhancement effects (d+= -.35). However, two of the studies included in the analysis that 
had longer suppression periods did find enhancement effects. Both studies measured 
thought frequency using a diary method over the course of four days, and both studies 
showed a significant, positive initial enhancement effect (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; 
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Rassum, Merkelbach, & Muris, 1997) and a correlational analysis done by the authors 
found that longer suppression periods showed larger initial enhancement effects. Another 
factor that the authors mention is that they did not consider cognitive load, and note that 
immediate enhancement effects were found when participants were given cognitive tasks 
to complete while suppressing the thought (Abramowitz et al., 2001).   
 Distress after Suppression. Rebound effects have also been found in emotional 
and affective responses. Although studies of unwanted thoughts using personally relevant 
thoughts are uncommon, a study in 1995 used thoughts of former romantic partners 
(Wegner & Gold, 1995). Experimenters instructed participants to think of their former 
romantic partners, and measured their skin conductance level as a measure of distress. 
Participants who suppressed thoughts of former loves for whom they still had feelings 
showed a resurgence in distress after suppression. Wegner and Gold termed this response 
an emotional rebound effect and determined that this effect may occur when people 
suppress thoughts that are personally relevant. The suppression of emotional thoughts 
seems to prevent the person from habituating to the thoughts and thus reduce their 
upsetting nature. It's possible that suppression of these thoughts even elevates one's 
emotional response to the thought (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). It is also possible that the 
suppression itself may strengthen the anxious associations of whatever is being avoided. 
For example, a study that looked at the effects of suppression on neutral and distressing 
situations found that suppression led to an increase in reported anxiety associated with 
both the neutral and the distressing thought (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994).  
The research just reviewed explored the causes and maintenance of repetitive and 
intrusive though in general and for the most part did not distinguish between what might 
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cause worry as opposed to rumination. The following section describes two theoretical 
explanations, one for worry and one for rumination. 
Theoretical Integration of Empirical Findings                                            
The Cognitive Avoidance Theory of Worry. Worry, like suppression, can be 
conceptualized as a type of cognitive avoidance (Borkovec, 2004). Much of Borkovec's 
cognitive avoidance theory of worry is theoretically rooted in Mowrer's (1947) two-stage 
theory of fear, which holds that fear is acquired with classical conditioning and 
maintained with operant conditioning. By avoiding feared situations, fear of those 
situations is maintained by preventing unreinforced exposure to them, which would be 
necessary for extinction of the fear. In classical conditioning, in order for extinction to 
occur the conditioned stimulus has to repeatedly occur without the unconditioned 
stimulus (Pavlov, 1927). As described earlier, worrying seems to prevent physiological 
symptoms and most likely deeper emotional processing (Andor, Gerlach, & Rist, 2008). 
By dampening the physiological reactions to unpleasant thoughts worry allows one to 
cognitively avoid the thought, thereby maintaining the anxious reaction to the thought 
and reinforcing the avoidance through worry. This reduces distress in the short term but 
also prevents habituation to the feared situation. Because of this, worrying is initially 
reinforcing but serves to maintain the anxiety and also prevent solving the problem, since 
the thoughts during worry are often vague and make it difficult to prevent a feared 
situation or come up with a reasonable plan to deal with it (Borkovec, 2003). By 
preventing one from emotionally processing a situation or thinking about it specifically or 
thoroughly to solve it worry becomes a self-reinforcing process that leaves little room for 
clinicians to intervene. When someone fears something external a technique like graded 
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exposure can work because the stimulus can be presented a little at a time at manageable 
levels until the person habituates to its presence (Borkovec, 2003). When the fear is of a 
certain thought because of the anxiety that thought causes, the exposure is more difficult. 
Worrying is not actually processing the thought it is avoiding it. Because of this, someone 
suffering from excessive worry needs to somehow be exposed to the presence of the 
thought without responding by actively worrying about it in order to extinguish his or her 
fear response. In this way, a person must accept the presence of the thought and be 
comfortable in its presence in order for extinction to occur. In sum, worry is a form of 
cognitive avoidance that prevents one from habituating to a feared situation. If a person is 
unable to tolerate the presence of an upsetting thought actual and specific problem-
solving is unlikely to occur (Borkovec, 2003). 
The Goal-Progress Theory of Rumination. One of the prominent theories 
regarding the basis of rumination is Martin and Tesser’s (1996) goal progress theory. 
This explanation has more to do with the content of the thought than the experience of the 
thought, in that it hypothesizes that rumination begins when one recognizes a discrepancy 
between what their current situation and their ideal situation, or a blocked goal.  The 
initial response of dwelling on these blocked goals can sometimes be helpful with short-
term problem solving, but unhelpful when it is continued for an extended period of time. 
Klinger (1977) characterized actions (and thoughts and emotions) as being part of 
organized action systems, which are part of lower order and higher order life goals. When 
an organized action system is not completed, one sees it as blocking a higher order goal, 
and what will follow are more and more attempts to achieve that goal, or complete that 
action system by repeating familiar strategies. Mandler’s (1975) framework of emotion 
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defines emotion as requiring an autonomic nervous system response (ANS). The degree 
of emotional intensity of a situation will be directly related to the amount of ANS arousal 
present. In order for ANS arousal to be present, interruption of an organized action 
system is considered sufficient and possibly necessary. Mandler characterizes the strategy 
people use to deal with these interruptions with the familiar phrase “if at first you don’t 
succeed, try again” (Mandler, 1975, p.156).   
 An example of the above would be young man who wants to go out on a date with 
young woman. His lower order goal in this situation may be to have a successful date 
with an attractive woman, but his higher order goal may be to have a close relationship, 
to be understood, or maybe just to be loved in general. When she turns down his offer for 
dinner, he may recognize this as blocking his lower order goal, but his emotional reaction 
may be heightened by the fact that his lower order goal of a nice date is actually a step on 
a ladder to his higher-order goal of being loved. According to Klinger and Mandler’s 
theories, his initial reaction would probably be to become somewhat preoccupied with 
how he can get this particular girl to go on a date with him. If he continues to think about 
this particular woman without success this could have dire consequences for him (and 
her) and ultimately more likely keep him from reaching his goal than help him. Research 
that supports this account has shown that rumination has been linked to stalking behavior.  
 In a recent study that looked at this connection, undergraduate students completed 
a questionnaire that included how often they had engaged in certain behaviors when 
pursuing either a romantic interest or a former romantic partner (Dennison & Stewart, 
2006). All of these behaviors were potentially intrusive and fell into four subscales; direct 
communication, covert pursuit, self-harm, and other harm. One of the main findings of 
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the study was a strong correlation between covert pursuit and rumination, which included 
things like following the person, spying, spreading false rumors, and changing classes or 
offices to be closer to a person. Applying these results to the example of the young man, 
rather than moving on and finding someone else, the man in question would be caught up 
in thoughts of his failure, and this would prevent him from having new, healthy social 
interactions that would help him move on from his loss. In this way, rumination has an 
element of avoidance in it as well, but whereas anxiety is characterized by cognitive 
avoidance, rumination can be seen as a kind of behavioral avoidance, with the ruminative 
thoughts serving to remind the person that they are a failure and should probably not 
attempt something new because they would probably fail at it. Pessimism is one of the 
symptoms of depression making thoughts like these more likely (DSM-IVR, 2000). 
Supporting this was a study that looked at self-reports of depression, anxiety, rumination 
and avoidance in college students. Results showed that rumination and behavioral 
avoidance remained correlated when anxiety was controlled, and cognitive avoidance and 
rumination disappeared when anxiety was partialled out (Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & 
Wong, 2007).   
 To our knowledge there have been no experimental tests of Goal Progress Theory. 
Although there are a large number of strong experimental studies on suppression, they are 
for the most part laboratory studies looking for basic science explanations of the 
mechanisms that cause and maintain repetitive thought, and most of them focus on the 
comparison of suppression to acceptance or suppression and a monitor-only group. The 
theory and experimental research in this area is abundant, but there is a gap in the 
research that includes direct application of interventions based on the explanations and 
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the consideration of individual differences and how they may impact treatment success. 
In the next section, the need for new and effective treatment components for GAD will be 
highlighted and the clinical literature’s extensive research on the links between repetitive 
thought and internalizing disorders will be reviewed.  
Prevalence and Current Treatment Rates for GAD.  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder affects an average of 5% of people over the course 
of their lives and up to 25% of those presenting in anxiety disorder clinics have the 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p. 473). Recent work 
has also specifically examined the prevalence of GAD symptoms in college students 
specifically.  A longitudinal study that looked at the presenting problems of an average of 
1,020 students a year in counseling centers across 13 years found that the number of 
students experiencing problems due to stress and anxiety increased from 36% in 1988 to 
63% in 2001 (Benton, Robertson, Tseng, Newton & Benton, 2003). Though there are 
relatively high rates of successful treatment for GAD it is still the least successfully 
treated anxiety disorder (Brown, Barlow, & Liebowitz, 1994). GAD is associated with 
twice the amount of primary care visits and rarely spontaneously remits. The most 
frequent cormorbid diagnosis is that of Major Depressive Disorder. Results from clinical 
trials suggest that psychotherapy can be effective for treating anxiety, in fact a meta-
analysis looking at effectiveness of manualized therapies found that the median effect 
size at termination was large for GAD (.9; Westen & Morrison, 2001). However, when 
considering the intent-to treat group (including those who did and did not complete 
treatment), improvement rate was 44%. For those that did complete treatment 52 % of 
those with GAD were considered improved. This leaves a large number (48%) of people 
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seeking treatment who are not considered improved, pointing to an opportunity for 
researchers to explore new treatment components that can be of use to clinicians.  
Comorbidity. The National Comorbidity Study found that 57% of a lifetime 
sample of depressed patients had a comorbid anxiety disorder (Kessler, 1997) and 
association of GAD with dysthymia and MDD were .64 and .59, respectively (Kruger, 
1999). In a confirmatory factor analysis of NCS data, GAD fit better with major 
depression and dysthymia than the rest of the anxiety disorders (Krueger, 1999). These 
disorders have been referred to as “distress disorders” due to their large underlying 
component of negative affectivity (Watson, 2005). It's difficult to disentangle the 
direction of influence between anxiety and depression but comorbidity seems to be 
associated with increased severity of the primary disorder, length of disorder and lower 
recovery rates and in general, suicide risk is higher in   patients with both anxiety and 
depression than those with pure depression (Bronisch & Wittchen, 1994). 
Clinical Perspectives: Repetitive Thought and Internalizing Disorders  
 The goal of clinical and other applied studies of repetitive thought has generally 
been to clarify the direction between various psychopathologies such as anxiety and 
depression and the tendency to engage in repetitive thought. There are significantly fewer 
studies that investigate specific causal mechanisms or causal effects of specific treatment 
components for particular types of repetitive thought.  
The association between repetitive thought and internalizing disorders has been 
well supported (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 
2007). Usually worry is considered to be specifically associated with anxiety and 
rumination with depression. Excessive worry (along with anxiety) is the central 
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characteristic of GAD (American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p. 472) 
and the relationship of rumination and depression has been shown in numerous studies 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). 
 Rumination and Depression. Susan Nolen-Hoeksema developed the response-
styles theory or rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), which focuses primarily on the 
links between rumination and depression. The response-styles theory proposed that 
people have consistent, trait-like patterns of responses to depression, that the style of 
response people have may influence the depressive episode, and that a ruminative 
response style tends to lead to longer and more severe episodes of depression. A 
ruminative response style is defined as one that focuses on the fact that one is depressed, 
one’s symptoms of depression, and why one is depressed. Results from a number of 
studies support the idea that rumination is not only a trait-like pattern, but also that it can 
lead to a variety of negative outcomes for both clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
 A study in which authors explored the relationship of rumination and recovery 
after a spouse's death found that people who were more ruminative a month after their 
partner's death were also more likely to be pessimistic about the future (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). Levels of rumination were assessed using a semi-
structured interview that asked explicitly how respondents were coping with the loss. 
Higher levels of rumination at one month predicted levels of depression at six months 
even when controlling for initial depression, social support, pessimism, gender and other 
stressors (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Another study of grief over a partner's death 
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found different results that nonetheless pointed to the maladaptive nature of a ruminative 
response style. Men whose terminally ill romantic partners had recently died were 
assessed for well-being and asked to describe what they were feeling, what they were 
thinking, what helped and what made things more difficult. Men were considered to have 
a more ruminative response style the more they mentioned regrets over what they hadn't 
done before their partner died, the more intrusive thoughts they had about the death and 
the more they focused on negative feelings. Men with higher scores on these measures 
showed higher levels of distress both 1 month and 12 months after the loss than men who 
engaged in less rumination. Rumination did not predict levels of depression, positive 
states of mind or intrusive thoughts about the loss after controlling for these measures 
right after the loss. However, it did predict scores on positive morale, which seemed to 
reflect an advanced level of adjustment supporting the idea that rumination may interfere 
with emotional processing (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997). 
  Results have also supported the consistency of response styles. A study in which 
college students kept track of their moods and their responses to those moods every day 
for 30 days (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredickson, 1993) found that eighty-three 
percent of participants showed a consistent pattern of responses to their moods 
throughout the month of the study. Participants who described ruminative responses near 
the beginning of a depressed episode remained depressed for a longer time than those 
who did not a ruminative response style, even when controlling for the participants’ 
initial level of depressed mood.    
Experimental studies have looked at the impact of induced rumination on 
depressed mood. Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) conducted an experimental study 
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that explored the impact of passive rumination on induced depressed mood. They 
assessed undergraduate students’ depressive symptoms and then induced a negative mood 
by having participants read a depressing story and imagine that it was happening to them. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions; each condition 
intended to represent four different response styles to depressed moods. Participants in 
the ruminative-passive condition participants read sentences that involved themselves and 
their emotions. Participants in the distracting-passive condition read sentences that stated 
facts that did not involve themselves or their emotions. In the active conditions 
participants had these same sentences, but they were printed on large cards and the 
participants were asked to sort them either by relevance to themselves (ruminative-active) 
or alphabetically (distracting-active). After the tasks, the participants’ mood was again 
gauged. Participants in the distracting-active condition (walking around, sorting facts 
alphabetically) showed the greatest reduction in overall level of sadness, and those in the 
ruminative-passive condition (quietly sorting emotion and self-focused statements in 
order of how much they applied to themselves) showed the least reduction in sadness 
(Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994). Studies such as this one support the theory that 
one's ruminative response style to depressing events may lead to longer lasting and more 
severe depressive episodes.  
 Rumination has also been explored as a moderator for the finding that women are 
more prone to depression than men (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994). In the first of this 
pair of studies participants were assigned to either a negative mood-induction or a control 
condition in which there was no mood induction. Participants were then given a choice 
for the next phase of the experiment; they could rank emotion-related items, or items that 
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were not related to emotions. In both conditions, 92% of the women and 46% of the men 
chose the emotion-related items. The response styles theory would suggest that this 
tendency to focus on emotions, even when in a depressed state, may make women more 
vulnerable to longer and more severe episodes of depression. In the second study, 
participants (125 men and 74 women) were given the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
and the Response-Styles Questionnaire (RSQ), which gauges response styles to 
depressive events. Two weeks later participants again took the BDI. Initial depression 
levels were the largest predictor of time 2 depression levels, but this was closely followed 
by participants’ response style. Gender was not a significant predictor of time 2 
depression levels when response styles were taken into account. These results indicate 
that the differences in rates and vulnerability to depression between men and women may 
not be about gender but instead be caused by differences in tendency to ruminate (Butler 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994).  
Many studies have supported the response-styles theory, but there are also studies 
that have contradicted it. Lara, Klein and Kasch (2000) found that rumination did not 
predict the duration of a major depressive episode in college students assessed six-months 
later. Some show that rumination seems to predict onset but not duration of depression. 
Results from an 18-month longitudinal study showed that participants who tend to 
ruminate as measured by the Response Styles Questionnaire were more likely to 
experience a depressive episode than those who did not. However, rumination did not 
predict the duration of the depressive episode.  
 These findings clearly show support for the direct links of rumination and 
depression, and anxiety and worry are clearly linked as worry is one of the primary 
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diagnostic indicators of anxiety.  However, the relationships between certain types of 
repetitive thought and specific disorders are not always so clear. For instance, rumination 
has been found to be related with negative outcomes other than depression. A 
longitudinal study examined the results of four separate assessments of adolescent 
women given on a yearly basis (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007). 
Ruminative coping styles as measured by a shortened version of the Response Styles 
Questionnaire predicted higher levels of not only depressive symptoms, but also bulimic 
symptoms and substance abuse, which in turn predicted future increases in ruminative 
coping. The links between rumination, depression, worry and anxiety are especially 
intertwined, which is not surprising considering the high rate of comorbidity between 
anxiety and depression.  
 Rumination, Worry, Depression and Anxiety. Studies on the links between the 
general tendency toward repetitive thought and mood disorders have found meaningful 
links between different types of negatively valenced repetitive thought and both anxiety 
and depression. A longitudinal study that interviewed adults twice over the course of a 
year found that levels of rumination at the first interview predicted symptoms of not only 
depression but also anxiety at the second interview, and that people with a ruminative 
response style were more likely to have mixed anxiety and depressive symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000).   
 Across a pair of studies intended to further clarify these relationships, participants 
filled out self-report measures of anxiety, depression, and rumination (Segerstrom, Tsao, 
Alden, & Craske, 2000). Results from the first study showed an overall association 
between a tendency toward repetitive thought and negative mood. In the second study 
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measures were filled out before midterm exams (chosen because of it was assumed this 
was a stressful time). Repetitive thought was found to be responsible for about half of the 
variance on follow up measures of anxiety. Rumination has been shown to be 
significantly related to depression and anxiety, and both rumination and worry have been 
shown to be mediators for the relationship between neuroticism and the presence of 
anxiety or depression (Muris, Roeleofs, Rassin, Franken & Mayer, 2005). An 
experimental study found that laboratory inductions of worry elicited anxious and 
depressive affective states in close to equal amounts (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988).  
A more recent experimental study further explored the similarities and differences 
of worry and rumination and their interaction with depression, anxiety, positive and 
negative affect, and thought and imagery content in cognition (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & 
Sibrava, 2007). In this study half of the participants were asked to engage in worrying for 
five minutes followed by five minutes of ruminating, and half did this in the opposite 
order. In order to ensure participants could get worrisome or ruminative states they asked 
them to write down what they most often ruminated about and what they most often 
worried about and use these as cues. Worry was defined as intrusive thoughts or images 
about potential future events and rumination was defined as thoughts or images about 
past mistakes or failures. Throughout the ruminative and worrisome periods participants 
were asked every 60 seconds to write down what they were thinking about, when the 
situation they were thinking about occurred (or possibly would), and whether their mental 
content was mostly imagery, thought or other. Results showed that both worry and 
anxiety produced increases in negative affect and decreases in positive affect. Worry 
generated greater anxiety, and rumination greater depression. These results support the 
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idea that worry and rumination have an overall relationship to negative affect, but worry 
seems to be more related to anxiety and rumination seems to be more related to 
depression (McLaughlin, 2007). A correlational study in which the authors attempted to 
clarify the links between neuroticism, rumination, worry, anxiety and depression found 
significant correlations between neuroticism, rumination and worry, and all three were 
positively linked to both anxiety and depression. The results supported a mediational 
model in which neuroticism led to anxiety and depression by influencing levels of worry 
and rumination (Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005). 
 Based on this extensive research on the links between internalizing disorders and 
repetitive thought, Figure 3 portrays model that builds on these findings and proposes a 
developmental pathway leading to comorbid depression and anxiety with repetitive 
thought as one of the causal factors. In the model the proposed direction of influence is 
represented by arrows with heavy lines, the added associations supported by theory and 
research are represented by arrows with dashed lines. The model begins early in life, as 
many personality factors are inherited, and genetic influence has been shown to account 
for 41% of the variance in neuroticism (Jang, Livesley, & Vernon, 1996). The next stage 
in the model is the predisposition to worry. A stated earlier, an excessive pattern of worry 
is one of the main criteria for GAD. Tendency to worry has been associated theoretically 
with cognitive avoidance (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004), and avoidance has been 
shown to strengthen both affective responses and frequency of intrusive thoughts 
(Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Klein, 1991). GAD can then result in difficulties in interpersonal 
functioning accentuated by an exaggerated perception of personal failures (Eng & 
Heimberg, 2006), which should be discrepant with the goals that person has for 
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themselves. These discrepancies, according to Martin and Tesser's (1996) theory will 
then lead to ruminative thoughts, which have been shown to be associated with 
behavioral avoidance and withdrawal. Both behavioral avoidance and withdrawal have 
been associated with depression (Moulds, Kandris, Starr, Wong, 2007). Once one is 
depressed the depression can influence and fuel a number of the preceding factors and  
In sum, worry and rumination have been shown to have a profound, significant, 
negative impact on psychological well-being in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations. Thus, effective interventions for rumination could possibly result in the 
decreased severity and duration of disorders, and possibly avoid some disorders 
altogether. However, a lack of clear findings from the few experimental studies 
investigating how to reduce repetitive thought and a lack of application of knowledge of 
individual differences to treatment components leaves clinicians with few clues on how 
to effectively intervene. The purpose of the current study is to explore the effectiveness 
of an acceptance-based intervention and a goal-progress theory intervention on reducing 
worry and rumination. The next section briefly reviews some of the more recent research 
focusing on acceptance as an alternative to suppression as a way of treating repetitive 
thought.  
New Approaches to Repetitive Thought: Acceptance 
Early studies of thought suppression often compared thought suppression 
conditions to control conditions in which participants were told they could think of 
whatever they wanted, including the target thought (Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout, 
& de Jong, 1991), or conditions in which participants were expressly told to think of the 
thought (Wegner et al., 1987), both of which can be thought of as early versions of 
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acceptance of thoughts. For the most part these early “acceptance” conditions were found 
to be more effective than suppression in a wide range of domains (Abramowitz, Tolin, & 
Street, 2001; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
One study that compared the impact of expressing a thought to actively suppressing a 
thought asked participants to provide a situation that made them feel anxious, angry or 
neutral (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994). Participants were then asked to speak aloud about 
whatever came to mind for five minutes to practice verbalizing spontaneous thoughts. 
Following this practice period participants were asked again to verbalize their thoughts 
for five minutes but in one condition they were instructed to suppress thoughts of the 
previously mentioned situation, and in the other condition they were instructed to keep 
thinking about the previously mentioned situation. After this period all participants were 
asked to attempt to think of the previously mentioned situation and speak aloud for five 
minutes, again mentioning the thoughts of the situation any time it came to mind. During 
the second period, participants who were in the suppression condition initially showed an 
increase in the statements about the target situation. Participants in the initial expression 
condition showed a decrease in the statements about the target situation (Roemer & 
Borkovec, 1994).  
More recent studies looking at the impacts of suppression and acceptance have 
focused less on examining the ineffectiveness of suppression and more on the positive 
impact of acceptance.  One correlational study exploring acceptance strategies found that 
people who naturally tend to accept the presence of their personally intrusive thoughts 
were less likely to be distressed or have a need to act on the thoughts than those who 
naturally tend to suppress their unwanted thoughts (Marcks & Woods, 2005). The second 
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study in this paper was experimental and compared the impact of a new intervention 
intended to increase acceptance of an unwanted thought to a suppression period. The 
intervention was based on Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, 
& Wilson, 1999), and was intended to increase the participants’ willingness and ability to 
experience uncomfortable thoughts and feelings without avoidance or struggle. This 
study compared frequency of unwanted thought and discomfort ratings during three 
sessions: a baseline session, an experimental session (in which participants were either 
monitoring their thoughts, suppressing their thoughts, or receiving the acceptance 
intervention) and another session. In order to record thought frequency, participants 
pressed a button on a counter whenever they experienced the thought. Results showed 
that participants were unable to suppress their personally relevant thoughts during the 
suppression period and showed increased distress after suppression. There were no 
differences found in frequency of the thought. However, those in the acceptance 
condition experienced a decrease in distress whereas those in the suppression condition 
did not. The authors suggested that this may be because acceptance is less about reducing 
frequency of a thought and more about changing one’s relationship to a thought. 
However, it is also possible that this strategy did not reduce the frequency in thoughts 
because participants’ tendencies toward a particular repetitive thought patterns (such as 








Statement of the Problem 
Repetitive thought is related to a number of clinical disorders including depression and 
anxiety. Although the literature related to repetitive thought is vast, there is little 
integration between experimental studies investigating the causal mechanisms of 
repetitive thought and applied studies that focus on the relationship between repetitive 
thought and psychopathology. There has also been little research on interventions 
intended to target individual differences in patterns of repetitive thought. 
In order to address these gaps in the literature, in the current study the 
effectiveness of two different types of interventions was compared. The acceptance 
intervention was adapted from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, 
& Wilson, 1999) and, based on the cognitive avoidance theory of worry, was targeted 
toward those who tend to worry. The overall aim of the acceptance intervention was to 
reduce worry by increasing participant’s comfort with their distressing thoughts, which 
should reduce their need to resort to cognitive verbal-linguistic activity and inhibit 
emotional processing, which would stop the reinforcement cycle of cognitive avoidance 
that is currently in place.  
The second intervention was targeted toward reducing rumination by exploring 
alternatives to meeting unmet goals. Mandler (1975) suggests that alternative routes to 
completing the interrupted sequence can reduce the intensity of emotion in response to an 
interrupted task (or blocked goal). Ironically, recognizing these other alternatives may be 
difficult for those that have a tendency to ruminate, because if they are in a negative 
affective state, their attention tends to be narrowed, and their problem-solving less 
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creative (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 2004). Using the earlier example of the smitten 
young man, he may be somewhat depressed and unable to recognize that he in fact has 
many avenues to being loved, through his friends, his family and other possible partners. 
The ultimate goal of this intervention was to increase participants’ awareness of other 
routes to achieving their higher-order goals even though their lower order goals may 
remain blocked, thereby stopping their persistent attempts to solve the problem using 
familiar but ineffective strategies.  
Because of the possibility that these interventions may change one’s relationship 
to an unwanted thought rather than its frequency, the current study will look at not only 
the impact of the intervention on frequency of the thought but also negative and positive 
emotions associated with the thought. 
By exploring the effectiveness of these interventions, this study will capitalize on 
the experimental methodology of laboratory studies to investigate questions of applied 
relevance, namely both the mechanisms behind repetitive thought and what types of 
interventions work best for these particular types of repetitive thought, worry and 
rumination. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The acceptance procedure will be more effective at reducing the amount of 
time spent thinking about their unwanted repetitive thought for those participants who 
tend to worry than those participants who tend to ruminate, whereas the intervention that 
is based on goal-progress theory will be more effective for participants who tend to 
ruminate at reducing the amount of time spent thinking about their unwanted repetitive 
thought than it will for those that tend to worry. As stated earlier, much research has been 
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done about the ineffectiveness of thought suppression at reducing the frequency of 
unwanted thoughts.  The goal of the ACT intervention is to reduce suppression by asking 
the participant to accept the existence of the thought, to avoid judging the thought or 
trying to make the thought go away. People who tend to worry have a tendency to 
suppress their unwanted thoughts, and the purpose of this procedure will be to lead them 
to respond in a different manner, hopefully stopping their path toward Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder. Conversely, the ACT intervention will not address the pattern most 
frequently exhibited by those who tend to ruminate, for whom suppression and cognitive 
avoidance is not the issue. Time spent on the thought will be measured by seconds spent 
verbalizing about the situation or thought the participant specified. The aim of the Goal 
intervention is to show the participants that there are other ways of meeting their higher-
order goals that do not require them to keep thinking about their current problem. If it is 
true that the participants are ruminating because of their tendency to focus on their 
inability to solve a higher-order goal, this intervention should succeed in removing their 
initial reason for ruminating by making it clear that there are other paths to solving this 
goal. This intervention is not expected to be as effective for the worriers because it does 
not have the same focus on reducing suppression and cognitive avoidance. 
Hypothesis 2: The acceptance intervention will be more effective for those that tend to 
worry at reducing the implicit and explicit negative affect associated with the thought 
than it will for those that tend to ruminate, whereas the intervention based on goal-
progress theory will be more effective for those that tend to ruminate at reducing the 
negative affect associated with the thoughts than it will for the worriers. According to 
Trinder and Salkovskis (1994), suppression prevents people from habituating to their 
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thought. The more that they attempt to suppress it, the more anxious they become and the 
more effort they put into suppressing the thought. As stated earlier, Wegner and Gold 
found that when participants suppressed emotionally relevant thoughts they were more 
likely to show an emotional rebound effect. It follows that those who tend to naturally 
suppress their unwanted thoughts may become more sensitive to their existence and the 
thoughts may cause them to experience more negative affect. On the other hand, those 
participants that tend to ruminate do not tend to attempt to suppress their unwanted 
thoughts, persistently dwelling on blocked goals, so this intervention should not impact 
their level of negative affect.  Mandler’s (1975) emotion theory holds that when a goal is 
blocked the emotional response will be moderated by substitute behaviors available at the 
time of interruption. The other pathways the participant generates during the goal 
progress intervention should then show them that there are available substitute behaviors 
they can engage in to achieve their goals, which should decrease the amount of negative 
affect they have in response to the thought. Negative affect will be ascertained from 
responses to the PANAS (explicit) and the number of negative word choices on the word-
completion (implicit). 
Hypothesis 3: The acceptance intervention will be more effective for those that tend to 
worry at preventing the decrease in positive emotions associated with the thought than it 
will for those that tend to ruminate, whereas the intervention based on goal-progress 
theory will be more effective for those that tend to ruminate at preventing the decrease in 
positive emotions associated with the thought than it will for the worriers. As stated 
earlier, negatively valenced repetitive thought has been associated with decreases in 
positive affect as well as increases in negative affect (McLaughlin, 2007) and thus these 
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This study was an aptitude (type of repetitive thought) x treatment (treatment 
condition) experiment exploring the impact of repetitive thought tendency as a moderator 
for effectiveness of different interventions intended to reduce frequency and distress 
caused by repetitive thought. Frazier, Tix and Baron (1996) provide a number of 
guidelines for testing moderator effects that will be followed in both the design and 
analyses of this study. Effect size was estimated before data collection. The number of 
participants were assigned to each condition will be as equal as possible in order to 
maintain power, and the assumption of homogeneous error variance was tested using an 
online program suggested by Frazier et al. (1996).  
Participants 
Participants included 89 undergraduate students from a large Mid-Atlantic 
university who were recruited through psychology classes. Students were recruited based 
on their results of an online questionnaire available to students in introductory 
psychology classes. On a semi-annual basis, students in introductory psychology courses 
are asked to take this questionnaire and given extra-credit for their participation.  This 
mass-screening questionnaire included the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, and 
participants with a score greater than 45 were sent an email with an invitation to partake 
in the study (See Appendix A). A cut-off score of 45 has been found to maximize 
sensitivity (.99) and specificity (.98) in differentiating GAD patients from non-anxious 
controls (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003). It was estimated that a minimum 
of 91 participants were needed based on an a priori power analysis specifying a medium 
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effect size, an alpha of .05 and power of .80. However, although 109 participants were 
initially recruited, due to attrition 96 participants took part in the second timepoint of the 
study, meaning the attrition rate was 12%.  Additionally, four of the participants’ data 
was unusable due to a technological failure and two of the participants’ data was 
considered unusable because coders considered their initial descriptions of worries as an 
indication that those participants were not taking the question seriously. The mean age of 
the participants in the original sample was 19.1 years (SD = 1.59). Of the entire sample 
(n=109), 12 of the participants were African American (11%), 75 were white (69%),  11 
were Asian or Pacific Islander-American (13%), eight were Latino/a (7%), and three 
described themselves as “other” and did not specify (3%).   Eighty-three (76%) of the 
participants were female, and 26 (24%) were men. Participants were compensated for 
their participation with extra credit. 
Measures 
Vulnerability to GAD and Tendency to Worry. The Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; See Appendix B) was 
used to assess anxiety during recruitment and used to assess tendency to worry during 
time 1. The PSWQ is a 16 item 5-point scale designed to assess pathological worry. It has 
shown high internal consistency (=.88-.95) and test-retest reliability (.74-.92 over 2 to 
10 weeks) with college samples. The largest correlate of the PSWQ is neuroticism (r = 
.74) (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Example items include “my worries overwhelm me” 
and “many situations make me worry.” Participants rate the items on a scale ranging from 
1 (not at all typical of me) to 4 (very typical of me). Studies have shown that the PSWQ 
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can be reliably used to identify individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (Fresco, 
Mennin, Heimberg & Turk, 2003; Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2003).  
Specific Thoughts. Participants were asked to self-generate two repetitive thoughts 
that they struggle with. Based on findings from previous research in which type of 
repetitive thought tendency has had more influence than type of a specific generated 
thought, the hypotheses involved tendency to worry or ruminate and not whether the 
specific thought provided was a worry or a rumination. In order to provide them the 
freedom to come up with either a rumination or a worry, the question read “Often times, 
people repeatedly think about situations that they would rather not think about. Examples 
of this include but are not limited to worrying about something that could happen in the 
future or replaying an upsetting event over and over again in your mind. Before going 
onto the next screen, please take a moment to try to think about a situation or event you 
wish you could stop thinking about. If possible, this should be a situation that you either 
have been thinking about for a while or think that you will be thinking about for a while. 
In other words it should be likely that this situation will still be relevant to you a week 
from now. After you have thought of something, please move on to the next screen and 
with as much detail as possible describe a specific past, current, or future upsetting 
situation or interaction that is something you think about more than you would like to and 
is hard for you to stop thinking about. It can be difficult to narrow it down to only one 
situation or event, and you will have the opportunity to describe two different situations. 
Once you have thought of your answer please check the box below.” Once they checked 
the box, they were brought to the next screen, which asked them again to describe the 
thought in detail. Two coders were asked to look over the worries in order to make sure 
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that the responses to this question were taken seriously and would be appropriate for the 
study. Agreement between coders was perfect with a Kappa of 1.0 (p<.001).  
Descriptions that were not included were “failing the test today” and “hungry”.  
Tendency to Ruminate. The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991; See Appendix C) is a 22-item subscale of the Response Styles 
Questionnaire and was used to measure tendency to ruminate. Each item is rated on a 4-
point scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Example items include “go away 
by yourself and think about why you feel this way” or “try to understand yourself by 
focusing on your depressed feelings”. The RRS has shown high internal consistency 
(=.89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morow, 1991, =.90; Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, 
Heimberg, 2002). The construct validity has been supported as well. Scores on this scale 
have been shown to correlate significantly (r=.62) with reports of ruminative responses to 
depressed mood in a diary study (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow & Fredrickson, 1990).  It 
has also been shown to predict self-reported depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994) and onset of threshold depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). 
Positive and Negative Affect – Explicit Measure. The Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988; See Appendix D) was used at 
each time point. During time 1 it was used to measure how the participant has felt in the 
past few weeks, and at time 2 it was used to measure the participant’s levels of positive 
and negative current mood after the interventions. The PANAS (See Appendix D) is a 20 
item self-report scale used to measure positive and negative affect. Each item is rated on 
a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The PANAS 
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can be used to measure affect for varying amounts of times (e.g. today, past few days up 
to a year) and evidence suggests this doesn't affect the measure's psychometric properties 
(Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Reliability and validity of the PANAS has been 
explored with a large non-clinical sample and good reliability for both the Positive Affect 
(PA) Scale ( = .89, 95%; CI=.88-.90) and the Negative Affect (NA) Scale (=.85, 95% 
CI = .88-.90) (Crawford, & Henry, 2004). The PA and NA scales have been found to be 
relatively independent, sharing only 5.8% of variance. A difference thought to be present 
between depression and anxiety is a lack of positive affect in depression (Clark & 
Watson, 1991). The construct validity of the PANAS has been supported using this 
theory, in that the correlation between PA and depression has been shown to be 
significantly larger than that between PA and anxiety. Also, although both PA and NA 
are correlated with depression, PA (8.3%) has been shown to account for significantly 
more variance on measures of depression than NA (4.7%) (Crawford, & Henry, 2004) 
Positive and Negative Affect– Implicit Measure. A word-stem completion 
measure (See Appendix E) was used to implicitly assess participants’ levels of positive 
and negative emotion after the intervention (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Marquez, 
Reid, & Koole, 2007). The measure includes 14 stems that can be completed to form 
positive, emotion words and neutral words (e.g. joy or jog) and 14 stems that could be 
completed to form both negative emotion words and neutral words (e.g. angle or anger). 
Because no validity or reliability data for this measure was available, another measure 
intended to get at participants’ levels of negative and positive emotion was also used.   
Positive and Negative Affect. Participant negative and positive emotion word 
usage during verbalizations after the intervention was assessed using the Lingustic 
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Inquiry and Word Count  (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007).  The LIWC was 
designed to analyze the emotional, cognitive and structural aspects of verbal and written 
speech. It includes a large number of subscales, but this study only used two categories: 
“positive emotions” (e.g. love, nice, sweet) and “negative emotions” (e.g. hurt, ugly, 
nasty).  The positive emotion category contains 406 words, and the negative emotion 
category contains 499 words. These categories have been found to have high internal 
reliability (=.97 for both scales).  Because of time constraints, the verbalizations could 
not be transcribed, so in order to use the LIWC in this study, two research assistants 
separately recorded all words they thought could possibly be considered positive or 
negative emotion words when listening to the recorded data. These were combined into a 
larger list, and one research assistant then typed in the possible positive and negative 
emotion words to a free website designed to return the percentage of positive and 
negative emotion words contained in the LIWC dictionary based on text entered.  These 
percentages were calculated back into number of words in each category and this number 
was used for the final data analysis. 
Procedure  
Participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology classes. Students in 
these classes had the opportunity to complete an online screening survey in the beginning 
of the semester for extra credit. This survey included the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
and participants who scored above 45 on this measure were contacted by email and 
informed that they were eligible to take part in this two-part research study for extra 
credit in their psychology class.  
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If the participants chose to participate in the study, they were sent an email that 
included information about how to sign up for both parts of the study one week apart, 
given a participant ID number,  and were sent a link to the time 1 survey on 
SurveyMonkey, an online survey tool. This survey lasted approximately 15 minutes and 
included an informed consent page, the Ruminative Response Scale, the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale, the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, and the request for a 
description of their specific repetitive thoughts.  
One week later at Time 2 the participants came into the laboratory for the second 
timepoint of the study. Participants signed a consent form and were then led by the 
experimenter into a small room within the lab.  Experimenters then instructed the 
participants to speak aloud for four minutes about anything that came into their minds, 
and reminded that it was important that they keep speaking for the entire time. The 
participants were assured that their results would remain confidential and they should feel 
free to speak about whatever thoughts come to mind. This time served as a practice 
exercise for speaking aloud after the intervention. It has been suggested that a practice 
period may help people set aside their concerns with the situation and more quickly get 
involved with the experimental task, as participants have been found to be more likely to 
report thinking of a thought they were attempting to suppress when they had a practice 
period to acclimate to the experience (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). During 
the practice period the experimenter left the room for this time period. After four minutes, 
the experimenter knocked on the door, told the participant they were finished with that 
portion of the study, led the participant to another room in the laboratory for the computer 
intervention and gave the participant a sheet with their descriptions of their thoughts from 
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the online survey. The experimenter asked the participants to read through their 
descriptions. If they wrote more than one thought both thoughts were on the sheet and 
they were asked to pick the one that was most relevant to them and circle it. The 
experimenter then told the participants that they may be asked questions about that 
particular thought during the intervention. After the participant read the description the 
experimenter started the intervention on the computer and left the room.  
Following this uniform procedure, the computer randomly assigned participants to 
one of two conditions; Goal Progress or Acceptance. This portion of the study was 
created using Medialab, computer software designed for psychology experiments. 
Instructions and interventions included both text on the screen and the experimenter’s 
voice reading the instructions and interventions aloud. 
Goal Progress Condition. The first portion of the computerized intervention for 
participants in the Goal Progress condition consisted of a computerized card sort. 
Participants compared their current concern with ten common higher-order goals, such as 
“having meaningful relationships” or “being independent” (See Appendix F) and ranked 
the concerns from most relevant to least relevant to their particular concern. The card sort 
activity included 10 computerized “cards”, each representing a higher order goal. The 
goals were adapted from the 12 content categories that (Emmons, Cheung, & Tehrani 
1998) developed in their coding system for “personal strivings” which are defined as “the 
characteristic types of goals that individuals try to achieve through their everyday 
behavior” (Emmons, 1986). Two of the content categories were dropped because of their 
lack of specificity of content (approach/avoid and self-defeating). Three of these are 
based on the “Big Three” (McAdams, 1999) motives (achievement, affiliation/intimacy 
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and power) but they also include other higher-order themes such as independence, self-
presentation and generativity. The wording of the cards was put in a relatable format. For 
example, the card representing the goal “affiliation/intimacy” read “to have meaningful 
relationships.”  The computer program then led participants through a series of questions 
designed to help the participant recognize that their current issue is only one way that 
they could meet their higher-order goal. For example, as part of this portion participants 
generated other available paths toward attaining their higher order goals that did not 
require solving their current concern.  
Acceptance Condition. The Acceptance intervention was based on an ACT 
exercise developed by Hayes (2005; see Appendix G). Similar, shorter exercises have 
been used in studies comparing thought suppression and acceptance (Marcks & Woods, 
2005). This exercise consisted of imagining a stream with leaves floating on top of it, and 
then placing any thoughts that come to mind on the leaves and watching them go by.  
Participants read words on a computer screen while at the same time hearing the words 
they were reading aloud (experimenter’s voice). The screens were timed (30 seconds 
each) to coincide with the sound. The intervention is intended to help delineate the 
content of a thought from the process of a thought. A common phrase in ACT is “buying 
a thought” meaning basically to take a thought literally (Hayes, 2005). Hayes explains the 
difference between “buying a thought” and “having a thought” by explaining that the 
thoughts people have are not what is problematic but rather their reactions to the thought. 
People struggling with unwanted thoughts may have difficulty separating the content of 
thinking from the process of the thinking. The ability to separate the content from the 
process allows one to get some distance from an unwanted thought and thus provides the 
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freedom to choose whether and how to respond to a thought. An example would be if you 
experienced the thought “nobody likes me”. If you “buy” that thought, it should be more 
difficult for you to evaluate it or choose how to respond to it. If you are able to recognize 
it as not necessarily a statement of fact but as a thought you are having and examine it 
from some distance, you should be able to evaluate it more realistically. If the participant 
is able to achieve this distance and practice observing their thoughts without reacting to 
them, the participant should be less likely to practice cognitive avoidance due to a 
decrease in negative emotion aroused by the presence of the thought.  After the exercise 
the participant responded to questions about what the exercise was like, what was 
difficult and what thoughts they became “stuck” on. These questions were intended not 
only to allow for deeper thinking about the process but also to make the intervention 
more interactive, increasing its similarity to the goal progress intervention.    
Following the interventions all participants completed the PANAS and the word-
stem completion task. When they finished the last task the computer program asked them 
to alert the experimenter, who led them back to the room where they had originally been 
asked to speak aloud. They were then asked to speak aloud again for four minutes, with 
their responses being recorded. Participants were then debriefed (See Appendix H) about 
the purpose of the study and thanked for their participation. An overview of the 









 In the following chapter, the results of all statistical analyses will be 
described. The chapter begins with results of the preliminary analyses, which includes 
details from the data screening process as well as descriptive statistics for all variables of 
interest. See Table 1 for bivariate correlations between these variables as well as the 
means, standard deviations, and internal consistency. See Table 2 for the means of 
outcome variables by condition. Following this section are the tests of hypotheses and 
additional analyses. 
Data Screening and Descriptive Statistics 
 All analyses were completed using the statistical package SPSS version 16. The 
variables used in the analyses were screened for missing values and normality and the 
scales were checked for internal consistency. A total of eleven missing values were found 
across the two time points in this PSWQ, RRS, and PANAS, and these were replaced 
using the participant’s means for that scale. Tests for skewness and kurtosis were done, 
revealing values lower than one, meaning that the variables were close to normally 
distributed. Bivariate correlations among all predictor and outcome variables were 
calculated (see Table 1). The relationship between tendency to ruminate (measured by 
RRS) and tendency to worry (measured by PSWQ) was .39, was moderate but low 
enough to assume they are not measuring the same construct.  The recordings of 
participants’ verbalizations after the interventions were coded separately by two research 
assistants for number of seconds spent talking and number of seconds spent talking about 
their target thought.  The ratings were examined for any large (more than five seconds) 
discrepancies and none were found. Krippendorff’s (2004) alpha () was calculated for 
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reliability using a macro created for SPSS (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). This measure 
corrects for chance and can be used for ratio data. Coders reached acceptable levels of 
reliability for both total time sent talking (=.88) and time spent on topic (=.84).  
General Analytic Strategy 
Moderated multiple regression was used to test the interaction effects of repetitive 
thought tendencies and type of treatment with levels of positive and negative affect and 
amount of time spent verbalizing about the target thought as the dependent variables, 
with alpha set at .05. Because of the possible problems with collinearity between 
tendency to ruminate and tendency to worry, alternative methods such as using 
proportion scores were considered. However, using proportion scores would have 
violated the assumption of independence and thus was ultimately deemed to be less 
satisfactory.   Additionally, using regression to some extent accounts for the overlap 
between these two predictors, because the individual beta weights examined for 
significance have the influence of the other variables partialled out. 
Regression was chosen over ANOVA due to the continuous nature of the 
proposed moderator (i.e., repetitive thought). Furthermore, ANOVA would have required 
establishing artificial cut points for the continuous variables of tendency toward 
rumination and worry, which has been shown to result in more Type I and Type II errors 
in detecting moderator effects (Frazier, Tix, & Baron, 2004). The treatment conditions 
(Goal Process and Acceptance) were dummy coded using the values 0 and 1, and the 
scores on the measures of rumination and worry were standardized (i.e., z-scored), which 
reduces problems with multicollinearity between variables (Aiken & West, 1991; Frazier 
et al 2004). The dummy code and worry z-scores and rumination z-scores were each 
multiplied together. These product terms represented the interaction between the 
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predictor (condition) and the moderator (type of repetitive thought tendency). The first 
step of the regression included three predictors: the dummy code for condition and the 
two z-scores of worry and rumination. The second step included the two interaction 
terms. The third step was not expected to produce a substantial three-way interaction, but 
is a statistical best practice in moderated multiple regression (Aiken & West, 1991).  
Step 1 
 z-scored Rumination Score 
z-scored Worry Score 
Dummy Code for Condition (0 = Goal Progress Condition, 1 = Acceptance 
Condition) 
Step 2 
 z-scored Rumination x Dummy Code for Condition 
z-scored Worry x Dummy Code for Condition 
z-scored Rumination x z-scored Worry 
Step 3 
z-scored Rumination x z-scored Worry x Dummy code for Condition 
 
 
The results of interest based on the hypotheses in this study were the moderator 
effects, rather than the main effects.2  However, the main effects will be presented in the 
                                                 
2A subset of studies from Abramowitz et al.'s 2001 meta-analysis in which participants were given 
permission to think of a target thought or instructed to think about it and repetitive thought was measured 
using the same method (streaming) as the current study showed that these interventions had a mean 
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additional analyses, as they may be of interest to some readers due to their examination in 
previous research. In order to interpret the results, the F tests were examined to see if 
there was a significant change in the variance accounted for in the second step of the 
regression as a result of the interaction term between worry x condition or rumination x 
condition. Examining the omnibus F to determine the significance of the entire step helps 
control for type 1 error that can be introduced by testing multiple moderators (Frazier et 
al., 2004). If the second step of the regression accounted for a significant amount of 
variance, then the individual beta for the worry x condition and rumination x condition 
interactions were examined for significance. As an estimate of effect size at the level of 
each interaction term, the squared semi-partial squared correlations between the variables 
of interest were examined by squaring the semi-partial correlation output generated in 
SPSS. If there were meaningful interactions between worry x condition or rumination x 
condition, then predicted values for the outcome variable at one standard deviation above 
and below the mean of the moderator were plotted in order to obtain a visual and 
practical significance understanding of the results.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The acceptance procedure will be more effective at reducing the amount of 
time spent thinking about their unwanted repetitive thought for those participants who 
                                                                                                                                                 
weighted effect size d+=.46+ so it seems reasonable to assume that conditions that have some aspect of 
acceptance are consistently effective (.23, -.12, Clark, Ball, & Pape, 1991; .63, Clark, Winton, & Thynn, 
1993; .03, .16, Davies & Clark, 1998; -.35, .68, .86, Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; .78, Wegner & Gold, 
1995; .57, Wegner, Carter, Schneider & White, 1987). Since both of the interventions in the current study 
have an element of acceptance the treatment conditions were not compared to a control condition.  
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tend to worry than those participants who tend to ruminate, whereas the intervention that 
is based on goal-progress theory will be more effective for participants who tend to 
ruminate at reducing the amount of time spent thinking about their unwanted repetitive 
thought (measured by seconds spent verbalizing about the situation described at time 1) 
than it will for those that tend to worry.  
The regression findings for hypothesis 1 did not reveal any significant interaction 
effects. The interaction terms of interest did not account for unique variation in number 
of seconds spent on the topic, thereby failing to support Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3).  
Hypothesis 2: The acceptance intervention will be more effective for those that tend to 
worry at reducing the implicit and explicit negative affect associated with the thought 
than it will for those that tend to ruminate, whereas the intervention based on goal-
progress theory will be more effective for those that tend to ruminate at reducing the 
negative affect associated with the thoughts than it will for the worriers. Negative affect 
will be ascertained from responses to the PANAS (explicit) and the number of negative 
word choices on the word-completion (implicit). 
Explicit Results. The interaction terms did not account for unique variation in 
participant scores on the negative affect subscale of the PANAS, thereby failing to 
support Hypothesis 2 (see Table 4).   
Implicit Results The interaction terms did not account for unique variation in the 
number of negative word stems completed by participants, thereby failing to support 
Hypothesis 2 (see Table 5).  
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LIWC Emotion Words. The interaction terms did not account for unique variation 
in number of negative emotion words said by the participant, also failing to support 
Hypothesis 2 (see Table 6).   
Hypothesis 3: The acceptance intervention will be more effective for those that tend to 
worry at preventing the decrease in positive emotions associated with the thought than it 
will for those that tend to ruminate, whereas the intervention based on goal-progress 
theory will be more effective for those that tend to ruminate at preventing the decrease in 
positive emotions associated with the thought than it will for the worriers.  
Explicit Results None of the interaction terms in the regression analyses testing 
for positive affect using the positive affect subscale of the PANAS accounted for unique 
variance, thereby failing to support Hypothesis 3 (see Table 7).  
Implicit Results None of the interaction terms in the regression analyses testing 
for positive affect measured by number of positive word stems completed accounted for 
unique variance, thereby failing to support Hypothesis 3 (see Table 8).   
LIWC Positive Emotion Results 
None of the interaction terms in the regression analyses testing for positive affect 
measured by number of positive emotion words used accounted for unique variance, 
thereby failing to support Hypothesis 3 (see Table 9).  
Additional Analyses 
 Four sets of additional analyses were done.  First, the first steps of all regression 
output were examined for any main effects of condition on the outcome variables. Type 
of condition was found to explain significant variance on the amount of time spent 
verbalizing about the topic (See Figure 5).  Specifically, those in the ACT condition 
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tended to spend less time focusing on their thought than those in the goal-progress 
condition (=-.25, p=.01), though the effect size was small by Cohen’s standards (.06). 
Type of condition also explained significant variance of the number of negative 
words said by the participant during the verbalization (See Figure 6).  Specifically, those 
in the ACT condition tended to use significantly lower amounts of negative words during 
the verbalization that followed the intervention than those in the goal-progress condition 
for both worriers and ruminators (=-.46, p<.01). This effect size was medium by 
Cohen’s standards (.22).  
Next, the participants concerns were coded by both research assistants with the 
goal of determining whether their specific concern was a rumination or a worry and a 
two-way ANOVA was done to see if this moderated the effects of condition on the 
outcome variables of interest.  The concern was considered a rumination if it was past-
focused, and a worry if it was future or present focused, based on the finding that one of 
the primary differences between the content of worry and rumination is that rumination 
tends to be focused on the past (Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005).  The reliability 
for the raters was found to be high, with Kappa = .87 (p<.001).  Coders discussed all 
disagreements until they were resolved. Results indicated no significant main effects of 
type of concern or interaction effects of type of concern by condition on any of the 
outcome variables of interest. 
Third, to ensure that the group differences in number of seconds talking about the 
topic were not confounded by group differences in total number of seconds talking, a t-
test was run and it was determined that the conditions did not differ significantly on this 
variable, (t=-.030, p=.976).  
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Fourth, in order to ascertain whether or not condition influenced the number of 
negative emotion words used above and beyond the time spent on the topic, another 
regression analyses was run with negative emotion words used as the dependent variable 
controlling for seconds spent on topic.  Once seconds spent on topic was entered along 
with worry, rumination, and condition in the first step of the regression equation 
predicting number of negative emotion words, condition still added unique variance 
significant at the p<.001 level (see Table 10), though the effect size was reduced to .13, a 







 This study compared two computer-based interventions intended to reduce 
frequency of unwanted repetitive thought, decrease negative affect and prevent 
reductions of positive affect in college students at risk for GAD and examined how scores 
on scales of tendency to worry or ruminate were associated with the effectiveness of the 
interventions. The first time point in this study took place online and participants filled 
out measures of tendency to ruminate and tendency to worry and were asked to describe 
unwanted repetitive thoughts that they wished they could stop thinking about. At the 
second time point the participants experienced one of two interventions, an intervention 
adapted from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and an intervention based on goal 
progress theory designed for the experiment. This study was unique in its exploration of 
type of repetitive thought tendency as a moderator for effectiveness of interventions 
intended to reduce the frequency of repetitive thought and the negative emotional impact 
associated with it. The interaction hypotheses for this study were not supported, though 
some interesting patterns were evident. This section will discuss the findings of this study 
in further detail. It will begin by reviewing the descriptive statistics determine 
generalizability. It will then review the tests of hypotheses and possible explanations for 
the findings. Next, the additional analyses will be discussed. After these findings are 
discussed the limitations of this study will be reviewed, as well as the implications for 




 The sample included in this study was predominantly female, perhaps limiting the 
generalizability of findings. However, the proportion of men in the overall sample (24%) 
was similar to the proportion of men in the initial screening sample of introductory 
psychology classes (30%) and there were no significant correlations between gender and 
other variables. This is in contrast to some previous studies that have shown that women 
tend to have higher rates of rumination and (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987), though this finding 
is not always consistent (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Roelofs, Hubers, Peeters, & 
Arntz, 2007).  No significant difference between genders was found in the mean scores 
on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. This finding is in line with research that has 
found that although women report more worry than men in the general population, among 
GAD patients that gender difference is not found (Startup & Erickson, 2006). The 
participants were screened in order to make the sample generalizable to a clinical sample. 
It’s interesting (and perhaps troubling) to note that the mean score for the entire sample 
of the screening questionnaire at the time of recruitment (n=691) was also above the 
clinical cut-off point used in this study (M= 51.48, SD=13.66) with 472 (68%) of the 
sample scoring above the cut-off point.  This supports the recent finding that the number 
of college students experiencing problems due to stress and anxiety is quite high (Benton, 
Robertson, Tseng, Newton & Benton, 2003).  
Tests of Hypotheses 
Contrary to prediction, repetitive thought tendency did not moderate the 
relationship between condition and the number of seconds spent discussing the target 
thought, positive affect after the intervention, or negative affect after the intervention. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this.  One possible explanation is that 
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contrary to previous findings showing the tendency to ruminate and the tendency to 
ruminate lead to different cognitive and behavioral responses to unwanted thoughts 
(Watkins, 2004), both may actually involve cognitive avoidance in different ways. Self-
report data has shown that people that tend to ruminate are more likely to react to the 
thought by trying to understand it better, whereas those that have a high tendency to 
worry are more likely to try to avoid thinking about the thought by replacing it with 
another thought or suppressing it (Watkins, 2004; Freeston, et al., 1991). It could be 
possible that these self-report measures of responses to thought do not sufficiently 
explain reactions to unwanted thoughts. It’s possible that through dwelling on possible 
causes, and meaning of upsetting situations one is still in effect avoiding becoming 
comfortable with the presence of the thought. According to the cognitive avoidance 
theory of worry, a person must accept the presence of an unwanted thought and be 
comfortable in its presence in order for extinction of a negative response to the thought to 
occur. If a person is unable to tolerate the presence of an upsetting thought, actual and 
specific problem-solving is unlikely to occur (Borkovec, 2003). This explanation would 
contradict Martin and Tesser’s (1996) goal progress theory of rumination. However, it’s 
also possible that since this is the first experimental test of the theory that we know of, 
the intervention designed for this study did not actually allow participants to disengage 
from their lower-order goal by exploring alternative avenues to reaching their higher-
order goal.  If this were the case it would not be surprising that this intervention failed to 
work any differently for ruminators or worriers, as it would not address the desire to 
achieve blocked goals, the theorized mechanism behind rumination. 
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Another explanation is that the average score on the PSWQ was relatively high, 
so even people who had a high tendency to ruminate as measured by the RRS tended to 
have a high tendency to worry as well.  These high levels of worry may have made it so 
that despite levels of rumination, these participants may be more likely to exhibit 
cognitive avoidance, which only the acceptance intervention was designed to address. 
Every effort was made to ensure the two conditions were as similar as possible 
except for the focus on acceptance of the presence of the thought in the acceptance 
condition and tying the current thought to higher order goals and considering alternate 
pathways to meet them in the goal condition. Nonetheless, an alternative explanation for 
the lack of findings could be that during the intervention there were some unintended 
differences that may have influenced the results. For example, those in the goal condition 
were asked more questions that were directly related to their target thought. It’s possible 
that these participants were in effect primed to think about their thought, and in a way 
they were just continuing the process they began during the intervention, which could 
have led to an increase in the frequency of the thought when compared to those in the 
acceptance condition, despite repetitive thought tendency.  However, participants in both 
conditions were reminded of their thought, asked to read through their descriptions and to 
remember their thought in case they had to answer any questions about it during the 
intervention. Also, the answers to the questions included in the acceptance condition 
regarding what thoughts the participants had difficulty with during the interventions 
almost always indicated their target thought. For example, one particular participant 
whose thought had to do with her friend who was in the army wrote “After I thought 
about my friend who is in the army, I visioned (sic) the words worried and scared.” This 
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pattern indicates that participants in the Acceptance condition were still very much 
thinking about their concern even if the questions did not directly ask about it.   
It’s also possible that the interventions were too similar to find the interaction 
effects that were sought after. If the differences were not sufficient, it may have obscured 
potential moderation effects.  
 
Additional Analyses 
 For both those who were high in rumination and those who were high in 
worry, those in the acceptance condition spent fewer seconds discussing their target 
concern, and those in the acceptance condition tended to use significantly fewer negative 
words during the verbalization that followed the intervention than those in the goal-
progress condition.  These results bring up the question of why these results were not 
found on either of the other two measures of negative affectivity. One explanation is that 
the PANAS and the word stem measure both took place on the computer directly after the 
intervention.  It’s possible that participants somehow felt different after the interventions 
than they did when they were still answering the questions, which may have been 
somewhat tedious.  This change in level of negative affect has been found in previous 
studies in which participants experienced a significant decrease in level of discomfort 
after engaging in an acceptance-based strategy (Marcks & Woods, 2005). Another 
explanation for the difference in findings between number of negative words and 
negative word completion is that the implicit measure may not be a valid measure, 
considering its fairly low internal reliability estimates. It’s also likely that especially for 
those that are high in worry thinking about how their thought relates to their larger goals 
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would not achieve the goal separating the content of the thought from the process of the 
thought as is hopefully done in the acceptance condition.   
There were no differences found between conditions on levels of positive affect. 
One explanation for the difference in findings between the number of positive words said 
and the number of negative words said is that this is primarily an anxious sample.  
Although both depression and anxiety share an underlying component of negative 
affectivity (Watson, 2005), one difference thought to be present between depression and 
anxiety is a lack of positive affect in depression (Clark & Watson, 1991). This means that 
those who have anxiety struggle primarily with high levels of negative affect, not low 
levels of positive affect. 
Limitations 
The hypotheses of this study were not supported, and though some of the analyses 
were informative, there were a number of limitations to this study that may have 
prevented finding the hypothesized effects. The first major limitation was the lack of a 
comparison group, although a number of factors supported this choice. The first factor 
was that it would have been extremely difficult enact an actual control condition that 
addressed the current questions. Because acceptance has been shown to be superior to 
suppression in so many studies, this study was intended to move beyond the question of 
whether or not acceptance can be more effective than suppression. The hypotheses for 
this study were not that these interventions would be effective, but that different 
interventions may work better for different people.  
 Another limitation in the design of this study was that the PSWQ was used both in 
the screening and as a measure of worry in the study.  This led to a lack of range in the 
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PSWQ when compared to the RSS, since the participants needed to score at least a 45 on 
the PSWQ initially to be included in the study.  This resulted in a sample that was made 
up of people who tended to be very high in worry, regardless of their level of rumination. 
This could mean that the hypothesized interaction effects still exist but were not evident 
due to the fact that the large majority of the sample was made of worriers, whose habitual 
cognitive avoidance would only be addressed in the acceptance condition. This would 
also result in the appearance of an overall lack of effectiveness of the goal progress 
intervention, when it’s possible that the sample simply did not include those for whom it 
would be effective. Though this adds complications, it is also a reflection of the real 
world, in which anxiety, rumination and worry often co-occur in different combinations, 
often with depression as well.  Because of the frequent co-occurrence of rumination and 
worry, perhaps it is just as important to focus on which interventions are most effective 
for those with a tendency to do both. Future studies could address this problem by 
recruiting participants using measures of both rumination and worry, and including only 
participants who had high levels of one and low levels of the other. Despite the lack of 
significant hypothesized findings, this study was necessary and important for furthering 
the still new line of research that focuses on acceptance interventions for reducing both 
frequency and negative emotional impacts of repetitive thought, and also for attempting 
to test goal progress theory, which to the best of our knowledge has not been done. 
Future Research and Practice  
The usefulness of the results of this study to practitioners may be somewhat 
limited due to the fact that the intervention is administered using a computer program. 
However, it was decided that the internal validity gained by ensuring each participant in 
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each condition has the exact same intervention was more important. The researcher 
attempted to temper this weakness somewhat by having a voice read what the participants 
are reading on screen to make the experience more similar to a human interaction. This 
issue should be addressed by future studies. Future studies would also benefit from 
increasing the dosage of acceptance interventions. Acceptance is not something that can 
be easily manipulated, and interventions are more likely to be done within the context of 
a therapeutic relationship. Though the search for effective treatment components requires 
dismantling the therapy process, such a brief intervention done within the context of a 
research study may limit both effectiveness and generalizability.  Earlier studies using 
similar interventions have called for more participant interaction, and although this study 
to some extent addressed this concern by asking participants to think critically and 
answer questions about the process as part of the intervention, future research could 
benefit from longer and more intensive interventions.  
As stated earlier it’s also possible that the intervention based on goal progress 
theory was unsuccessful in helping participants disengage from their lower-order goal. 
This intervention could also perhaps benefit by lengthening the amount of time 
participants are given and increasing the number of ways it attempts to help participants 
think of other ways of meeting their higher-order goals.    
Conclusions 
 The results of this study did not find support for any of the hypothesized 
interactions, and thus did not find support for the theory that interventions intended to 
reduce repetitive thought and its accompanying negative emotional impacts should be 
targeted toward repetitive thought tendency. However, additional analyses indicated that 
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interventions based on ACT have some promise in helping those who are struggling with 
repetitive thought and possibly the negative affect that comes along with it. The results 
also indicated that computer interventions could have promise in creating at least a short-
term positive impact on those that are struggling with symptoms of anxiety.  Differences 
found in outcomes between conditions are important results because unlike many 
previous studies that compare acceptance conditions with suppression, the goal condition 
in this study had no element of suppression, and in fact asked the participant to think 
about their unwanted thought. This may mean that just focusing the thought is not 
sufficient for habituation to occur for participants with levels of worry and a specific 




Table 1. Correlations, Ranges, Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Coefficients of the Predictor and Criterion 
Variables 
* p < .05  ** p < .01, ***p<..001 
1 Gender, 1=male, 2=female), 2Condition (1=Goal, 2=Acceptance), 3 Type (1=worry, 2=rumination), , 4 Ruminative Response Scale (tendency to 
ruminate), 5 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (tendency to worry), 6 seconds spent verbalizing about topic, 7 PANAS positive affect at time 1, 8PANAS 
negative affect at time 1, 9 PANAS positive affect at time 2, 10number of positive word stems completed, 11number of positive words said, 12PANAS 
negative affect at time 2, 13number of negative words said, 14number of negative word stems completed.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.  GEND1 1.00              
2.  COND2 .05 1.00             
3.  TYPE3   -.14 -.08 1.00            
4.  RRS4  .12 .03 .05 1.00           
5.  PSWQ5 -.05 .04 -.12 .39 1.00          
6.  TOPSEC6 .11 -.26* -.13 -.19 .09 1.00         
7.  POSPAN17   -.01 -.12 .12 -.18 -.30** .00 1.00        
8.  NEGPAN18 .04 .02 -.02   .25** .48** .22* -.09 1.00       
 9. POSPAN29 .04 -.09 .06 -.29** -.34** -.05   .72** -.06 1.00      
10.IMPPOS10 .14 -.14 .05 .15 .02 -.01 .07 -.05 .02 1.00     
11. POSWORDS11 .05 .15 -.05 -.10    -.07 -.19 .15 .04 .12 -.19 1.00    
12. NEGPAN212   -.08 .01 .01   .29**   .34** .18 -.12 .50** -.07 -.10 -.15 1.00   
13. NEGWORDS13 .18 -.47** -.11 -.16 .03 .51** -.01 .11 -.06 .00 .02 .02 1.00  
14. IMPNEG14 .05 -.14 .14 .24* .22* .05 -.06 .25* -.07 .24* -.17   .27** .12 1.00 
Possible Range N/A N/A N/A 22-88 16-80 0-240 10-50 10-50 10-50 0-14 0-14 10-50 0-14 0-14 
Obtained Range N/A N/A N/A 23-83 29-80 0-181 11-49 10-43 15-49 0-11 0-16 10-43 0-8 1-11 
Mean N/A N/A N/A 47.46 55.45 38.45 31.93 23.15 29.81 4.75 2.44 18.03 2.46 2.13 
Standard Deviation N/A N/A N/A 17.36 11.10 43.04 7.78 7.29 1.97 5.08 2.7 6.69 1.96 2.34 






Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Variables by Condition 
 Condition Total Seconds Talking 
Proportion of 








Time 2 PANAS 
(Positive) 
Time 2 PANAS  
(Negative) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Goal 
Progress 211.70 30.58 0.23 0.18 2.04 2.34 3.35 1.68 29.57 7.03 17.96 6.19 






















Table 3. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Seconds Spent on Topic 
 
Predictors R R2 df F  P Effect size r 
Step 1  . 36 .13 85 4.33       .01**  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 









Step 2  .41 .03 82 1.02   .39  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy     -.11  .49  .01 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 
      -.05 
  .16 
 .76 
.15 
  .00 
  .02 
Step 3  .41 .00 81 .276   .60  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy        .09  .60  .00 





Table 4. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Explicit Level of Negative Affect 
Measured by PANAS  
 
Predictors R R2 df F  P Effect Size r 
Step 1  . 38 .15 85 4.81      .00**  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 









Step 2  .40 .01 82  .37   .78  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy     .05  .74 .00 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 






Step 3  .40 .01 81 .62   .60  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy     -.13 .43  .01 




Table 5. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Implicit Level of Negative Affect 
Measured by Word Stem Completion 
 
Predictors R R2 df F  P Effect size r 
Step 1  . 31 .10 85 3.18      .01**  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 









Step 2  .32 .01 82 .16   .39  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy     -.04  .81 .00 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 






Step 3  .33 .00 81 .01  .94  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy      .01 .94  .00 




Table 6. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Implicit Level of Negative Affect 
Measured by LIWC Negative Emotion Words 
 




Step 1  .506  .256 85 9.742   .00  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 









Step 2  .541 .037 82 1.414   .24  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy      .14  .37  .01 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 




  .03 
  .02 
Step 3  .541 .000 81 .004   .95  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy     -.01 .95  .00 





Table 7. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Explicit Level of Positive Affect 
Measured by PANAS  
 




Step 1  . 39 .15 85    4.92       .00**  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 









Step 2  .40 .01 82 .26   .85  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy     -.11  .52  .00 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 




  .00 
  .00 
Step 3  .40 .00 81 .02   .90  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy     -.02  .90  .00 







Table 8. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Implicit Level of Positive Affect 
Measured by Word Stem Completion 
 




Step 1  . 22 .05 85 1.39   .25  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 









Step 2  .29 .03 82 1.02   .39  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy     -.11  .51 .01 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 






Step 3  .32 .02 81 1.61   .21  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy      .22  .21  .02 







Table 9. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Implicit Level of Positive Affect 
Measured by LIWC positive emotion words 
 




Step 1  .19  .04 85 1.04   .38  
  ZPSWQ 
ZRRS 
Dummy Condition 
     -.12 
 -.05 







Step 2  .22 .01 82 .35   .79  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy       .09  .66  .01 
 ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 
     -.02 





Step 3  .23 .00 81 .26   .61  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy      -.09 .61  .00 




Table 10. Summary of Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis Predicting Implicit Level of Negative Affect 
Measured by LIWC negative emotion words. 
 















   .00** 





Step 2  .65 .03  81 1.33   .27  
  ZPSWQ*Dummy     -.18 .19 .01 
ZRRS*Dummy 
ZPSWQ*ZRUM 






Step 3  .65 .00 80 .10  .75  
  ZPSWQ*ZRUM*Dummy      .09 .75 .00 
*   * p<.05  ** p < .01    
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Figure 1.  Frequent conceptualization of relationships between worry, rumination, 


















































































































aloud for 4 minutes 
Prescreen 
(PSWQ) 
Time 1: Specify 
Issues, RRS, PSWQ, 
PANAS 
Time 2 part 1: 
Choose issue, speak 





























































Your results on the mass screening questionnaire indicated that you are eligible to take 
part in our two-part study "Finding out how to stop worrying".  
 
You can complete the first part at home on your computer, and the second part will take 
place in our lab in the biology-psychology building a few days later.   The online portion 
should not take you more than 15 minutes and the in-lab portion should take 
approximately 30 minutes.  If you would like to sign up for the study, PLEASE 
FOLLOW THESE STEPS TO ENSURE YOU RECEIVE FULL CREDIT FOR BOTH 
PORTIONS.  
 
Step 1:  In order to receive the full amount of extra credit you must sign up for both parts 
of the study.  Please sign up for them AT THE SAME TIME (the online portion and the 
in-lab portion) on Sona systems using the code for the study which is rtstudy.  The two 
parts should take place within 3-7 days of each other.  If you cannot find an open slot for 
the second part, simply try a slightly later date to sign up for the first part. 
 
Step 2: After you sign up for the study on Sona Systems, WAIT FOR THE DATE that 
you signed up for your first part of the study.  You will receive a reminder from Sona by 
email. Please paste in the link below to access the first half of the study (the online 
portion) ON THE DAY that your part 1 is scheduled.  THIS LINK IS NOT 
AVAILABLE ON SONA SYSTEMS, it is only available below.  If you lose this email, 
please write us at this address to get it again.   
 
Step 3: When you follow this link and begin the survey on surveymonkey - you will be 
asked what your 2 or 3 digit ID number is.  Your assigned ID number is  XXX.  Please 
use this as your ID number - this id number will not work as the code to sign up for the 




Step 4: For part 2, please come to our lab in the Biology Psychology building room 
number 2101 on the date and time you signed up for using Sona Systems. 
 
Please let us know if you have any questions. 





Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec, 1990) 
 









1. If I do not have enough 
time to do everything I 
do not worry about it 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. My worries overwhelm 
me 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I do not tend to worry 
about things 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Many situations make 
me worry 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I know I should not 
worry about things but 
I just cannot help it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When I am under 
pressure I worry a lot. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am always worrying 
about something. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I find it easy to dismiss 
worrisome thoughts. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. As soon as I finish one 
task, I start to worry 
about everything else I 
have to do. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I never worry about 
anything. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. When there is nothing 
more I can do about a 
concern, I do not worry 
about it anymore. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I have been more 
worried this past week. 1 2 3 4 5 
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13. I notice that I have been 
worrying about things. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Once I start worrying, I 
cannot stop. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I worry all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I worry about projects 





Ruminative Response Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
Please indicate how often you think about the following. 
 Very 
slightly or 





Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Think about how 
passive and unmotivated 
you feel. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Think about how alone 
you feel. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Think about how sad 
you feel.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Think, “I won't be able 
to do my 
job/schoolwork because 
I feel so badly.”  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Think about your 
feelings of fatigue and 
achiness. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Think about all your 
shortcomings, failings, 
faults, mistakes.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Think, “Why can't I get 
going?” 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Think about how hard it 
is to concentrate.  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Think about how angry 
you are with yourself.  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Think “Why do I have 
problems other people 
don't have?” 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Think about how you 
don't feel up to doing 
anything.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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12. Think about how you 
don't seem to feel 
anything anymore.  
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Isolate yourself and 
think about the reasons 
why you feel so sad.  
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Go someplace alone to 
think about your 
feelings.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Go away by yourself 
and think about why you 
feel this way.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Try to understand 
yourself by focusing on 
your depressed feelings.   
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Analyze your 
personality to try to 
understand why you are 
depressed.  
1 2 3 4 5 
18. Analyze recent events to 
try to understand why 
you are depressed.  
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Listen to sad music.   1 2 3 4 5 
20. Think, “Why do I 
always react this way?” 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. Write down what you 
are thinking about and 
analyze it.   
1 2 3 4 5 
22. Think about a recent 
situation, wishing it had 
gone better.  





PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer next to that word.  Indicate to what 










Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Active 1 2 3 4 5 







Word Stem Measure (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Marquez, Reid, & Koole, 2007) 
Fillers 
 
B L A __ __ 
 
T H E __ __ 
 
Q U __ __ __  
 
E __ __  
 
T  E __ __  
 
S O __ __  
 




G R E  __ __ 
(great) 
 
H A __ __ __ 
(happy) 
 
P R O __ __ 
(proud) 
 
G O __ __ (good) 
 
C A __ __ (calm) 
 
G L __ __ (glad) 
 
J O __ (joy) 
 
A L __ __ __ (alert) 
 
E X C __ __ __ __ 
(excited) 
 
D E L I __ __ __ (delight) 
 
L O __ __ (love) 
 
A C T __ __ __ (active) 
 
C A R __ __ __ (caring) 
 
L I V __ __ __ (lively) 
 
C H E __ __ (cheer) 
 
U __ (up) 
 
E A S __ (easy) 
 











B A __ (bad) 
  
U P __ __ __ (upset) 
 
S A __ (sad) 
 
A N G __ __ (anger or 
angry) 
 
S C A __ __ __ (scared) 
 
W O R  __ __ (worry) 
 
L O __ (low) 
 
G U I __ __ __ (guilty) 
 
M A __ (mad) 
 
F E __ __ (fear) 
 
AF __ __ __ __ (afraid) 
 
S T R __ __ __ (stress) 
 
B L A __ __ (blame) 
 













Please complete these items to form a word in English (no proper names). Write the first 
word that comes to mind that fits. 
 
T H E __ __ 
 
E A S __ 
 
D O __ __ 
 
I N C L __ __ __ 
 
G R E  __ __ 
 
S A __ 
 




S O  __ __ 
 
L I V __ __ __ 
 
L O __ 
 
H A __ __ 
 
G O __ __ 
 
A L __ __ __ 
 
A C C __ __ __ 
 
H A __ __ __ 
 
C A __ __ 
 
F E __ __ 
 
E X C L __ __ __ 
 
W O R  __ __ 
 
C H E __ __ 
 
A N G __ __ 
 
S E C __ __ __ 
 
U P __ __ __ 
 
A C T __ __ __  
 
B A __ 
 
N __ __ 
 
L O N __ 
 
S C A __ __ __ 
 
G L __ __ 
 
J O __ 
 
T  E __ __  
 
G U I __ __ __ 
 
E X C __ __ __ __ 
 
E __ __  
 
P R O __ __ 
 
A C C __ __ __ 
 
Q U __ __ __ 
 
L O __ __ 
 
M A __ 
 
R E J __ __ __ 
 
S T R __ __ __ 
 
L I __ __ 
 
C A R __ __ __ 
 
B L A __ __ 
 
















Goal Progress Intervention 
On the next screen, you will see a list of goals.  Please use the mouse to arrange these 
goals in order from most relevant to your current concern to least relevant to your current 
concern.  
 
1)  Achievement 
To be successful or realize my potential.  
 
2. Affiliation 
Be accepted/liked by others.   
 
3. Intimacy 
Have close meaningful relationships. 
 
4. Power 
Have influence on others.    
 
5. Personal growth and health 
Grow to be a better or healthier person.   
 
6. Self-presentation 
Have others think well of me or appear attractive to others.  
 
7. Independence 
Be independent.   
 
8. Emotionality 
Be more in touch with my or other people's emotions.  
 
9. Generativity 
Make my life meaningful.  
 
10. Spirituality 
Become more spiritual/make religion or spirituality a bigger part of my life.    
 
 
Questions Following Card Sort  
 
1. In what way is your current concern related to the goal that you chose as most 
highly relevant? 
2. In what ways are you already meeting this goal? 
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ACT Intervention (Adapted from Hayes, 2005, page 76-77) 
 
 
Imagine a beautiful slow-moving stream. The water flows over rocks, around trees, 
descends downhill and travels through a valley.  Once in a while, a big leaf drops into the 
stream and floats away down the river.   
 
Imagine you are sitting beside that stream on a warm sunny day, watching the leaves float 
by. Now become conscious of your thoughts.  Each time a thought pops into your head, 
imagine that it is written on one of those leaves.  If you think in words, put them on the 
leaf as words.  If you think in images, put the on the leaf as an image.  The goal is to stay 
beside the stream and allow the leaves on the stream to keep flowing by.  Don't try to 
make the stream go faster or slower; don't try to change what shows up on the leaves in 
any way.  If the leaves disappear, or if you mentally go somewhere else, or you find you 
are in the stream or on a leaf, just stop and notice that this happened.  File that knowledge 
away and then once again return to the stream, watch a thought come into your mind, 
write it on a leaf, and let the leaf float away down stream.   
Continue to do this until you hear the tone.  After the tone, you will follow answer some 
questions about the exercise.   
Questions following intervention: 
1. How long did you go until you got caught by one of your thoughts.   
2. If you got the stream flowing and then it stopped, or if you went somewhere else in 
your mind, write down what happened just before that occurred: 
3. If you never got the mental image of the stream started, write down what you were 




















Thank you for participating in this study.  This study looked at the impacts of two 
different brief computer interventions intended to target both the amount of time spent 
focused on negative repetitive thought (worry or rumination) and the negative feelings 
that can arise as a result of the thoughts. 
 
During the first online survey, you completed measures of worry, rumination and 
negative and positive emotion.  These measures served as a baseline for the experimental 
study that took place at time 2.   
 
At the second portion of the survey, you first spoke aloud about your thoughts in order to 
become comfortable with the process of being recorded.  You were then randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions; one was focused on life goals and the other was an 
intervention adapted from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy.   Research has shown 
that suppressing unwanted thoughts can increase their frequency and at times increase 
negative emotions, so both interventions had an element of acceptance.   Research has 
also shown that those who tend to worry and those that tend to ruminate can differ in the 
reasons why they have negative repetitive thought.  In this experiment we were 
attempting find out a) if either intervention would have a positive impact, b) if one of the 
interventions worked better than the other and c) if one’s tendency to ruminate or worry 
would determine which intervention would be more effective.  After the intervention you 
took both implicit and explicit measures of positive and negative emotion.  Following the 
computer tasks, you once again spoke aloud and were recorded.  Your data will be coded 
for length of time and positive and negative focus.  If you are interested in finding out 
more about research on this topic please feel free to contact Sara Ericson at the contact 
information below. 
 
Thank you again for your participation in this study.  If you are ever concerned about 
personal issues, you can contact the counselors at the Campus Counseling Center at the 
University of Maryland (301.314.7651) or you may call the University Health Center 
(301.314.8106). If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact 
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